Who Controls Syria Now? Israel, Türkiye, or Iran?
Uncover how Iran, Türkiye, and Israel are redrawing Syria’s map: shaping borders, exploiting proxies, and rewriting the future of regional influence.
The End of Assad and the Breakdown of Regional Order
The removal of President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 represents a watershed moment in the Middle East's strategic landscape. His regime, for decades a cornerstone of regional geopolitics, served as the central pillar of Iran's “Axis of Resistance,” a transnational alliance linking Tehran to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Damascus. The sudden toppling of Assad by a coalition of rebel forces, many of whom are backed by Türkiye and influenced by Sunni Islamist ideologies, has shattered this foundational aligment.
In place of a centralized authority, Syria has become a zone of contested sovereignty. Its political vacuum and territorial fragmentation have invited direct interventions and proxy competition by neighboring states. The country no longer functions as a cohesive actor in the regional system but rather as a contested arena where multiple powers project influence to secure their strategic objectives.
Each external power seeks to prevent the emergence of a hostile regime, forestall the consolidation of rival alliances, and establish conditions favorable to their own security and economic interests. This structural displacement forces a reordering of regional strategies, replacing stable deterrence models with volatile, dynamic, and often contradictory coalitions.
This reconfiguration is not an episode of temporary disorder but a foundational shift in the logic of regional power. It compels states to adopt provisional, often risk-tolerant behaviors aimed at shaping outcomes on the ground in real time.
Iran’s ability to project influence westward has been interrupted; Türkiye seeks to institutionalize its gains through military bases and economic integration; and Israel transitions from containment to preemptive engagement. Syria, in this context, is less a sovereign entity than a strategic vacuum, a space structured by external imperatives rather than internal governance.
Israel Replaces Deterrence with Forward Control
Following Assad's ouster, Israel has embraced an unprecedented posture of strategic assertiveness. Historically, Israeli policy toward Syria emphasized border stability, deterrence against Hezbollah and Iran, and non-interference in Syria's internal affairs. That paradigm has collapsed. The absence of a strong state in Damascus and the rise of Turkish-backed Islamist factions near the Israeli frontier have radically altered Israel's threat calculus.
Israel now pursues a policy grounded in preemptive spatial control. This involves expanding its military footprint in southern Syria, particularly in the provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, beyond the Golan Heights into previously demilitarized zones. Israeli forces have established bases, conducted aerial bombardments, and engaged in limited ground operations aimed at dismantling Iran-aligned militias, deterring Turkish influence, and building alliances with minority communities such as the Druze.
This shift reflects a strategic doctrine based on denial and preemption. Israel seeks to prevent hostile actors from gaining footholds that could pose future threats. The cultivation of local allies, notably Druze factions and Kurdish elements, serves not only to extend Israeli influence but also to create buffer zones manned by sympathetic or at least non-hostile forces.
This approach is not a contingency plan but a deliberate effort to reshape the regional order, insulating Israel from strategic encirclement while projecting power into a destabilized Arab state.
However, this expansionist posture carries significant risks. Israel’s forward presence in Syria is increasingly perceived by Arab states and regional rivals as a hegemonic overreach. Moreover, its reliance on minority alliances creates brittle coalitions vulnerable to reversal if political conditions change.
The shift from reactive deterrence to proactive control may offer short-term security benefits, but it entrenches Israel in a volatile theater with open-ended commitments and uncertain strategc returns.
Türkiye Expands Its Influence but Faces Internal Strain
Türkiye has emerged as the dominant external power in post-Assad Syria through a combination of sustained proxy support, direct military deployments, and economic engagement.
Long before Assad’s collapse, Ankara invested in cultivating relationships with Syrian opposition groups, particularly Sunni Islamist factions like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which later played a pivotal role in seizing Damascus. As a result, the transitional Syrian government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa is heavily reliant on Turkish backing.
Militarily, Türkiye maintains thousands of troops in northern Syria and is negotiating basing rights in strategic locations like the T-4 airbase in Homs. Economically, Ankara is poised to dominate Syria’s reconstruction efforts. Turkish companies are already supplying construction materials, rebuilding infrastructure, and integrating Syrian markets with Turkish trade routes. These efforts aim to transform Syria into a satellite state within Türkiye’s broader sphere of influence, providing both strategic depth and economic dividends.
However, Ankara’s ambitions face significant constraints:
Domestically, the Turkish economy remains fragile, burdened by inflation, a depreciating currency, and political volatility. Public opinion is increasingly hostile to continued military expenditures abroad, especially with the prospect of another influx of Syrian refugees;
Externally, Türkiye’s expansion alarms both Israel and Iran, each of whom sees Ankara’s reach as a direct threat to their own regional positions.
Moreover, the presence of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria remains a strategic dilemma for Ankara. Türkiye views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization with which it has fought for decades. The prospect of a de facto Kurdish statelet along its southern border is intolerable to Ankara, and any atempt to forcibly remove the SDF risks confrontation not only with Kurdish fighters but also with the United States, which continues to support them.
Iran Loses Ground and Turns to Proxy Disruption
The collapse of the Assad regime has dealt a crippling blow to Iran’s regional strategy. For over two decades, Tehran relied on Damascus as the linchpin of its transnational alliance system (linking Iran to Hezbollah, Hamas, and various Shia militias in Iraq and Syria).
The fall of Assad has severed this logistical and ideological conduit. Iranian military positions in Syria have been dismantled or heavily targeted by Israeli airstrikes. Its allied militias have been pushed to the margins, and its diplomatic leverage within Syria has evaporated.
In response, Iran has pivoted to a strategy of indirect influence. It now seeks to disrupt rival alignments and retain a foothold in Syria through proxy warfare, clandestine supply lines, and covert alliances. This includes possible support to Kurdish factions, disaffected Alawite elements, and anti-Turkish militias.
Iran’s aim is not to restore dominance but to prevent the consolidation of an anti-Iranian bloc comprising Israel, Türkiye, and Gulf states. This effort is designed to impose strategic costs on its adversaries, complicate their plans, and preserve Tehran’s regional relevance.
However, this posture reflects
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